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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CLOSURE OF
THE TIME-LIMITED INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Valerie Oosterveld*
I. Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the international and hybrid crimi-
nal tribunals – such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) - are all part of an interlinked network of international criminal justice.
One significant difference between the ICC and these other tribunals is that the
ICC is a permanent institution while the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL are time-limited.
The SCSL will be the first of these tribunals to close. It is currently hearing its
final trial, that of the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor.1  The SCSL
will wind up its operations after the conclusion of the Taylor trial and any associ-
ated appeal, likely in late 2011 or early 2012.2  Under the latest estimates, the
ICTY and ICTR expect to complete their work in 2014.3  Two tribunals – the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon – are also time-limited.  Both originally estimated that proceedings
would cease after approximately three years, putting their potential closure dates
in 2012, but these dates will likely be extended.4
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario (Canada). The author was
involved in co-hosting, with the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Permanent Mission
of Canada to the United Nations, two expert group meetings in New York on the closure of the interna-
tional and hybrid criminal tribunals: “Planning for Residual Issues for International and Hybrid Criminal
Tribunals,” February 26-27, 2007; and “Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Mecha-
nisms to Address Residual Issues” on February 4-5, 2010. The meetings were funded by the Government
of Canada’s Human Security Program (2007) and Global Peace and Security Fund (2010).
1 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, (May 4, 2009), http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=GT0Wz4egOV0%3D&tabid=160.
2 U.C. BERKELEY WAR CRIMES STUDIES CENTER, THE OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CHARLES
TAYLOR MONTHLY TRIAL REPORT: MAY 2010 (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2010/06/
30/monthly-report-may-2010/ (The prosecution phase of the trial is completed and it is estimated that the
defense phase of the trial will be completed in October 2010, with a judgment expected in early-to-mid-
2011. Judgment on any appeal would follow within approximately six months, bringing the likely closing
date for the Special Court for Sierra Leone to late 2011 or early 2012).
3 Letter from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 to the President of the Security Council (June 1, 2010), U.N. Doc. S/2010/207,
Enclosures VIII-IX [hereinafter ICTY Letter] (Current estimates in the ICTY’s Karadzic case indicate an
end-date for that case of June 2014; while there is an estimated end-date for the ICTR’s Karemera et al.
case of December 2013, note that closure would not happen immediately after the end of the case).
4 EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://
www.eccc.gov.kh/english/faq.view.aspx?doc_id=48 (last visited June 30, 2010) (This potential for a date
extension is indicated on the website of the court); Agreement between the United Nations and the
Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, art. 21, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1757 (May 30, 2007) (“[T]he Agreement shall remain in force for three years from the date
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The establishment of temporary international criminal tribunals has given rise
to complex legal, technical, and political questions regarding the legal and practi-
cal obligations that continue after closure.  These obligations are usually referred
to as “residual issues” or “residual functions.”  This article will begin by discuss-
ing four central residual functions.  The first residual function relates to the trials
of fugitives.  The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL have indicted individuals who have not
yet been captured.  The international community is currently planning for what
will happen to both high-level and lower-level fugitives caught after the physical
closure of these tribunals.  The second residual function is the protection of vic-
tims and witnesses.  There are a large number of individuals who are under the
protection of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL as a result of their assistance to and
testimony before these tribunals.  This protection cannot simply end because the
tribunals close their doors, as this would greatly undermine the progress made in
securing the cooperation of victims and witnesses and eliminating impunity.  In
addition, it is not hard to imagine that victims and witnesses would stop cooperat-
ing with the ICC if those appearing before other tribunals were harassed, injured
or killed following the closure of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.  The third residual
function is the supervision of enforcement of sentences.  Each of the tribunals has
sentenced many individuals to lengthy prison terms, and these tribunals have a
continuing responsibility to ensure that these sentences are carried out in accor-
dance with international standards.  The fourth residual issue is one of the most
hotly debated: the preservation, protection, and provision of controlled access to,
the tribunal archives.  Current debates address how to best provide access to tri-
bunal archives to affected communities, including consideration of where to lo-
cate the tribunal archives.
After discussion of the residual issues facing the time-limited tribunals, this
article will address the residual issues which are also of concern to the ICC.
While the ICC is a permanent institution and therefore does not face the same
residual issues as the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, it will, at some point, end its
involvement in each of its situation countries and cases.  As it does so, the ICC
will face some of the same residual issues as the time-limited tribunals.  For
example, the ICC will need to address how it will continue to provide victim and
witness protection once it closes its field office(s) in the situation country.  The
ICC will also need to consider how to provide continued access to public archival
information to the affected populations, without necessarily assuming that they
have internet access or can travel to the ICC’s headquarters in The Hague,
Netherlands.
This article concludes that the ICC’s planning for its own residual issues can
be assisted by considering the lessons learned from similar planning for the
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.  Specifically, the ICC may benefit by keeping a field
presence in or near the affected communities in the years following the comple-
tion of its investigations and cases in a situation country.  This field presence can
continue witness protection work and provide access to public archival informa-
of commencement of functioning of the Tribunal and that the Parties will, in consultation with the Secur-
ity Council, review the progress of the work of the Tribunal.”).
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tion.  In so doing, the ICC can also help to protect its legacy.  Proper “comple-
tion” planning by the ICC for its situation countries and cases is important: just
as for the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, if the ICC simply terminates operations and
walks away from a situation country, the positive effects of its work could be
undermined and future cooperation by witnesses and others with the Court (in-
cluding in other situations countries) could be jeopardized.
II. Residual Issues Facing the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL
Due to their judicial nature, the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL cannot simply cease
operations once their current trial and appeals activities are completed.  The
tribunals have continuing legal and practical obligations that must be addressed
at the point of closure and for years into the future.  The four main residual issues
are explored in this section: trial for indicted fugitives, ongoing protection for
victims and witnesses, supervision of enforcement of sentences and management
of archives.  In addition, other residual functions are briefly mentioned, including
review of judgments and assistance to national authorities.
A. Trials for Fugitives and Referral of Cases to National Jurisdictions
What should be done with those individuals who have been indicted by the
time-limited tribunals but who still remain at large at the time of the closure of
the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL?  The Security Council and the tribunals have clearly
articulated their common position: there can be no impunity for fugitives.5  The
Council has indicated that high-level fugitives will be tried at the international
level, if caught.6  These high-ranking accused are, for the ICTY, Ratko Mladic´
and Goran Hadzˇic´, and for the ICTR, Augustin Bizimana, Fe´licien Kabuga and
Protais Mpiranya.7  The cases of lower-level accused are to be referred to domes-
tic jurisdictions.8  The Special Court for Sierra Leone has one indictee who has
not yet been brought to justice, Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma is suspected to
have died in Liberia in 2003, but his indictment remains open absent proof of his
5 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the administrative and budgetary as-
pects of the options for possible locations for the archives of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the seat of the residual
mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, para. 74, U.N. Doc. S/2009/258 (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter The Secre-
tary-General Report] (on the views of the Security Council’s Informal Working Group on International
Tribunals); ICTY Letter, supra note 3, para. 88 (on the views of the ICTY); Letter from the President of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the President of the Security Council (May 28, 2010),
U.N. Doc. S/2009/687, para. 15 [hereinafter ICTR Letter] (on the views of the ICTR); SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE: JUNE 2008-MAY 2009 51 (2009) [hereinafter SCSL REPORT] (on the views of the SCSL).
6 Letter from the Charge´ d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the President of the
Security Council, para. 15, U.N. Doc. S/2009/687 (Dec. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Charge´ d’affaires].
7 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 18; ICTR Letter, supra note 5, paras. 23, 24 and
Annexes 2 and 3 (note that The Secretary-General Report refers to four high-level accused among 13
ICTR fugitives. Since the report was issued, two fugitives were caught and transferred to the ICTR,
reducing the number of fugitives to 11. One of these fugitives was high-level accused Idelphonse
Nizeyimana).
8 Charge´ d’affaires, supra note 6, para. 15.
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death.9  In May 2008, the Special Court’s judges amended the SCSL Rules of
Procedure and Evidence to allow the Koroma case to be referred for trial in
another jurisdiction.10  The SCSL is currently considering its transfer to a compe-
tent national jurisdiction.11
In order to be able to hold fugitives accountable, the tribunals’ residual mecha-
nisms will need to continually track fugitives and seek cooperation from states
and organizations for their arrest and transfer.  If a fugitive is captured, the rele-
vant residual mechanism must be able to quickly transform into a functioning
criminal tribunal.  Specifically, the tribunal must be able to try a high-level ac-
cused, or in the case of a lower-level accused, refer the case to a ready and
willing domestic jurisdiction, in a state in the territory of which the crimes were
committed or in which the accused was arrested or which has jurisdiction and is
willing and adequately prepared to accept the case.12  If the latter course is taken,
the residual mechanism must also be able to monitor the referred case to ensure
that it meets international standards.13  The latter option mainly affects the ICTR,
which currently has eight lower-level fugitives.14  However, it is not clear if this
is a realistic option.  To date, the Prosecutor of the ICTR has attempted to refer
lower-level cases to domestic jurisdictions, especially Rwanda, but has not been
successful.15  The Prosecutor has also indicated that he intends to continue to
seek the referral of fugitives not deemed necessary to try at the international level
but has “indicated difficulties in finding States willing and adequately prepared
to accept these cases.”16  This residual function could persist for decades, de-
pending on the lifespan of the fugitives and how long they remain at large.
B. Protection of Victims and Witnesses and Contempt Trials
One of the most crucial issues relating to residual functions is the need to
ensure continued protection of victims and witnesses  (and, in some instances,
9 War Crimes Court Probes Death Report, BBC NEWS, Jun. 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/2992462.stm (reporting on Koroma’s suspected death); Tracey Gurd, The Open Society Justice
Initiative, Stephen Rapp, Special Court Chief Prosecutor Answers your Questions, Part II (Sep. 2, 2009),
http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2009/09/03/stephen-rapp-special-court-chief-prosecutor-answers-your-
questions-part-ii/ (reporting that Koroma’s death has not been definitively proven by the Office of the
Prosecutor, so the indictment remains active).
10 Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11bis, http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=YNjqn5TIYKs%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter SCSL Rules of Procedure].
11 SCSL Report, supra note 5, at 51.
12 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11bis, U.N.
Doc. ITR/3/Rev.19 (2009), [hereinafter ICTR Rules of Procedure]; International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11bis, UN Doc. IT/32/Rev.44 (2009)
[hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure]; SCSL Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, at Rule 11bis (noting
that the SCSL Rules only provide for referral to “a State having jurisdiction and being willing and
adequately prepared to accept such a case”).
13 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, paras. 33-34 (international standards include, for ex-
ample, the rights of the accused to a fair trial and safety from the imposition of the death penalty).
14 ICTR Letter, supra note 5, paras. 54, 59.
15 Letter from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the President of the
Security Council (May 14, 2009), U.N. Doc. S/2009/247, paras. 29, 69.
16 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 35.
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their dependents) who have appeared before the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.17  Many
of these individuals put their lives, and the lives of their immediate family mem-
bers, at risk by providing evidence to the time-limited tribunals.  If there is an
interruption or an arbitrary stoppage of this protection due to the closure of the
tribunals, these witnesses and their families may again be at risk for harassment,
injury or death.  A failure to provide uninterrupted protection not only puts wit-
nesses at risk and damages the credibility of the tribunals, it also endangers the
work of other existing tribunals, such as the ICC, and any future time-limited
tribunals.18  Witnesses will be less likely to assist the ICC or other tribunals if
they have heard that witnesses were put at risk following the closure of the ICC’s
operations in a situation country or of the time-limited tribunals.
Currently, judges of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL issue orders for the protection
of victims or witnesses during the proceedings of a case, and these orders may be
revisited as needed.19  This protection can range from non-disclosure to the pub-
lic of identifying information about a victim, witness, or their relatives; expung-
ing names and identifying information from the tribunals’ public records; hearing
witnesses in closed session; and assigning pseudonyms; to physical relocation of
a witness and his or her family to another country (for example, insider wit-
nesses).20  These orders are implemented through the work of the Registry of
each tribunal.21  There are more than 1,400 ICTY witnesses and 2,300 ICTR
witnesses subject to protective orders.22  The Office of the Prosecutor may also
carry out protective measures for the purpose of investigations and trials (such as
for informants and their families).23
Residual mechanisms for the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL will need to be able to
carry out all of these judicial and administrative tasks after the closure of these
tribunals. In  doing so, the mechanism will, inter alia: (1) keep track of the vic-
tims and witnesses to inform them of relevant developments (such as the release
17 Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice & The Univ. of W. Ont. Faculty of Law, Report of the Residual
Issues Expert Meeting on Planning for Residual Issues for International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals
(2007), para. 5, available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/ICTJ_ResidIssues_2010rp_Final.pdf
[hereinafter Expert Meeting Report]; see also Cecile Aptel, Planning for Residual Issues and Mecha-
nisms for International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Briefing Paper 4 (2007).
18 Expert Meeting Report, supra note 17, para. 5; The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para.
29.
19 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SC Res. 827 U.N.
Doc. S/Res/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1184-85 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SC Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1608,
1610 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; SCSL Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, at Rule 75.
20 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, paras. 26, 28 (stating that the ICTY has “concluded
13 agreements under which States accept in principle to consider the relocation of witnesses to their
country”).
21 Annex to the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 16(4), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinaf-
ter SCSL Statute]; The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 27.
22 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 28 (as of May 2009— this number is likely to
have increased in the interim).
23
 Id. para. 25.
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of a convicted person);24 (2) keep track of the observance and variation of the
protective measures;25 (3) address requests for assistance with respect to existing
protective measures or new measures requested in a trial of a captured fugitive or
other residual proceeding;26 (4) serve as a contact point for states in which vic-
tims and witnesses have been relocated;27 (5) monitor and assess threats to ensure
that protective measures for specific witnesses remain effective, or have a third
party do so, and revise protective orders as necessary;28 and (6) review the neces-
sity for continued relocation of witnesses and assist with their transfer to another
state if relocation is no longer required.29
After the physical closure of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, court orders must
continue to be respected, including those related to the protection of victims and
witnesses.  Should a victim or witness be threatened, he or she must be able to
rely on the residual mechanism for continued protection and investigation of the
threat, and launch, if necessary, of proceedings for contempt.  This is crucial to
ensuring both the safety of victims and witnesses and the integrity of the tribu-
nals’ work.  Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the tribunals, each
tribunal may hold in contempt anyone who knowingly and willfully interferes
with the administration of justice.30  The residual mechanisms must be provided
with similar judicial powers.31  The victim and witness protection residual func-
tion, including the ability to hold contempt proceedings, will be required for
many years and could last for the lifetime of any particular convicted person,
victim, or witness.32
C. Supervision of Enforcement of Sentences
Residual mechanisms will also be required to monitor and review the
sentences of individuals convicted by the tribunals.  The international and hybrid
criminal tribunals do not have their own prisons and thus individuals convicted
by these bodies must serve their sentences in the prisons of willing states.  The
24 Gabrie¨l Oosthuizen, Open Society Justice Initiative, The Residual Functions of the UN Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone:
The potential role of the International Criminal Court, para. 27, (Sept. 30, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), http://www.iclsfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/iccpotentialresidualfunctionrole-brief-
ing-paper-icls-to-osji-final-websitero2.doc.
25 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 26 (The residual mechanisms may need to issue
varying judicial protection orders if, for example, national immigration authorities request access to in-
formation because a protected person seeks asylum or immigration to that country).
26 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 27.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 ICTY Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, at Rule 77; ICTR Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, at
Rule 77; SCSL Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, at Rule 77.
31 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, paras. 23-24. There have been many motions for
contempt at the ICTY and ICTR and it can be expected that a residual mechanism would also face such
motions.
32 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 9 (such protection could, in certain circumstances, last beyond the
lifetime of a convicted person (for example, if retaliatory threats stem from that person’s family).
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ICTY, ICTR and SCSL have entered into sentence enforcement agreements with
a number of states.33  The Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL state that
sentences of imprisonment are to be served in accordance with the applicable
laws of the state in which the convicted person is imprisoned, subject to the
supervision of the tribunals.34  This means that if the convicted person is eligible
for pardon, early release or commutation of sentence in the state of imprison-
ment, then the state must notify the tribunal.  In the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, the
President consults with the judges and decides whether or not to grant pardon,
early release or commutation of sentence, “on the basis of the interests of justice
and the general principles of law.”35  In making a decision, the President takes
into account “the gravity of the crime or crimes for which the prisoner was con-
victed, the treatment of similarly situated prisoners and the prisoner’s demon-
strated rehabilitation, as well as any substantial cooperation of the prisoner with
the Prosecutor.”36  A May 2009 report of the Secretary-General noted that, of 39
applications for early release submitted to date, the ICTY President granted 22,
while the 6 applications submitted to date at the ICTR were all denied.37  Thus,
the residual mechanisms for these tribunals will need to be able to provide for
such consultation and Presidential decision-making on an ongoing basis.
The residual mechanisms for the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL will also need to
provide supervision of the prison conditions for all convicted persons, to ensure
that they meet international standards.  In many of the sentence enforcement
agreements entered into with the States, the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL have en-
trusted the International Committee of the Red Cross with the task of conducting
regular and unannounced visits to the prisons, and presenting confidential reports
on their findings.38  It is expected that similar arrangements will continue with
the residual mechanisms of the tribunals.  Other responsibilities under this
residual function include: negotiating enforcement agreements with states (for
example, with respect to the conviction of a captured fugitive); transferring con-
victed individuals to the state of enforcement or from one state of enforcement to
another; making arrangements for the relocation of a prisoner once he or she has
served the sentence; and, in the case of death while serving sentence, arranging to
repatriate the body of the deceased person.39
33 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 39 (referring to sentence enforcement agree-
ments entered into with the ICTY and ICTR); SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE HOMEPAGE, http://
www.sc-sl.org/HOME/tabid/53/Default.aspx (click on “Documents” tab and then scroll down to “Sen-
tence Enforcement Agreements.”  Referring to sentence enforcement agreements entered into by Finland,
Rwanda, Sweden and the United Kingdom with the SCSL).
34 ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 27; ICTR Statute, supra note 19, art. 26; SCSL Statute, supra
note 21, art. 22.
35 ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 28; ICTR Statute, supra note 19, art. 27; SCSL Statute, supra
note 21, art. 23.
36 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 37.
37 Id.
38 Id. para. 39; Amended Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, Spec. Ct. of Sierra Leone-Rwanda, art. 6, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Link
Click.aspx?fileticket=WNTKRbIUNNc%3d&tabid=176 (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
39 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 38.
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This residual function will likely need to be exercised for many decades.  For
example, the ICTY has sentenced Milomir Stakic´ to 40 years,40 the ICTR has
sentenced Juve´nal Kajelijeli to 45 years,41 and the SCSL has sentenced Issa Has-
san Sesay to 52 years of imprisonment.42
D. Management of Archives
The fourth residual issue is the preservation and protection of the archives of
the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.  The tribunals hold and manage vast amounts of
public and confidential records, evidence, data and other materials in paper, elec-
tronic, audio, video, physical and other formats.  There are two main reasons why
the archives must be carefully preserved and protected indefinitely.  First, the
archives will be required to conduct all of the other residual functions, such as
trials of captured high-level fugitives, victim and witness protection and sentence
enforcement monitoring.43  Second, the archives will also be used, in the future,
for research, for the preservation of memories and for education (including the
prevention of historical revisionism).44  The archives are not only a set of docu-
ments for the tribunals: they also constitute a historical record for Sierra Leone-
ans, Rwandans, and the people of the states of the former Yugoslavia.
The management of the tribunals’ archives as a residual function is complex.
The tribunals’ records are both public and confidential.  Confidential records in-
clude transcripts of closed trial sessions, documents containing identifying infor-
mation and information provided to the Prosecutor on a confidential basis (which
cannot be disclosed without the consent of the person or entity providing the
initial information).45  Over time, certain records may be declassified and made
publicly available.46  While confidential records must be kept separate from pub-
lic records and under strict security conditions, the principle of archival integrity
requires that public and confidential documents remain in the same location and
not be transferred to separate locations.47  Thus, the management of the archives
following the closure of the time-limited tribunals must simultaneously preserve
all relevant material – public and confidential – as well as protect the confidential
material (and therefore, the protected victims and witnesses), and provide varying
levels of access to officials of the residual mechanisms (including judges, Prose-
40 Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, at 142 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia March 22, 2006).
41 Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, at 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda May 23, 2005).
42 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, at 480 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone Oct.
26, 2009).
43 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, paras. 54-55.
44 Id. para. 42.
45 Id. para. 43.
46 Id.
47 Id. paras. 43, 195.
20 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 8, Issue 1
The International Criminal Court
cutors, Registrars, respective staff members and defense counsel),48 as well as
other relevant individuals such as state officials pursuing domestic prosecutions,
academic researchers, affected populations and others.49  Of course, the residual
mechanisms will generate more archives due to their work, especially if there are
trials of high-level captured fugitives.50
One contentious issue has been where to locate the archives of the tribunals.
The dual nature of the archives – as working documents for officials of the
residual mechanisms and as documents intended to preserve memories and pro-
mote education – creates difficulties if the work of the residual mechanism is in
one jurisdiction and the affected population is in another.  For example, if the
SCSL residual mechanism is hosted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the
Netherlands,51 then it makes sense for the archives to be in the Netherlands in
order for SCSL officials to access them.  On the other hand, locating the archives
in Europe could make it difficult for Sierra Leoneans to access the documents.
One potential solution would be to have an information center with copies of
relevant public documents in Sierra Leone.52
While the need to preserve archives for tribunal residual functions will last
until the death of the longest-serving convicted person or the longest-living pro-
tected victim or witness, the need to preserve records and materials for historical,
research, policy, academic and other related purposes is virtually unending.  The
management of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL archives could therefore prove to be
one of the most difficult residual functions.
E. Other Residual Functions (Review of Judgments, Assistance to National
Authorities)
The residual functions outlined above can be supplemented with other, less
obvious but also important, residual functions.  The Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR
48 Id. para. 54 (noting that “[J]udges, Prosecutors, Registrars, respective staff members and defense
counsel are the primary users of the Tribunal’s records and gain value from them).
49 Id. para. 59 (“victims, witnesses and their families, the populations of the affected countries,
[g]overnment officials, other international tribunals and courts, such as the International Criminal Court,
journalists, historians, legal researchers, political scientists and persons interested in memorializing an
event or creating educational materials” should all be provided access to the material).
50 Id. para. 58.
51 The SCSL’s Charles Taylor Trial is currently being hosted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, “Courtroom for Special Tribunal to Host Taylor Trial (May 17, 2010),
http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/189 [hereinafter Special Tribunal] (The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has indi-
cated openness to hosting the SCSL’s residual mechanism). See Giorgia Tortora, The Special Tribunal
for Lebanon and the Discussion on Residual Mechanisms, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. (forthcoming
2010).
52 The idea of supplementing tribunal archives with regionally based information centers has been
discussed within the Security Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, but the
creation of such information centers is not considered by Council members to be a residual issue (rather,
it is considered a legacy issue). See Anne Joyce, The Role of States in the Closure of the International
and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, in Getting to Closure: Winding Up the International and Hybrid Crimi-
nal Tribunals, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. (forthcoming 2010). The May 2009 Report of the Secre-
tary-General discusses the creation of information centers, such as those that already exist in various
districts in Rwanda (currently funded by the European Union, ICTR and Government of Rwanda). See
The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, paras. 235-37.
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and SCSL provide that, where a new fact is discovered which was not known at
the time of the trial or appeals proceedings, and which may have been a decisive
factor in reaching the judgment, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may sub-
mit an application for review of the judgment.53  For the Prosecutor, this right is
limited to a period of 12 months after the delivery of the judgment.54  For the
convicted person, this right does not have a time limit.  This open-ended right is
linked to the possibility that evidence exonerating convicted individuals could be
discovered (for example, in state archives) decades after conviction by the tribu-
nal.  The Tribunals consider the review of judgments to be an essential residual
function, the unavailability of which would impinge on the rights of the con-
victed individuals.55  This residual function must be available for the lifespan of
the convicted individuals.
Another residual function is the provision of assistance to national and interna-
tional authorities.  The tribunals respond to requests for assistance from national
authorities such as immigration departments and domestic prosecutors, and from
United Nations agencies.  The ICTY and ICTR consider this assistance to be
essential “to maintain the ability of the national legal systems to prosecute those
not subject to proceedings before the Tribunals.”56  In order to assist the national
authorities, a decision may be needed to vary a protective order for a protected
witness.57  This residual function will be required for at least the next three or
four decades because domestic prosecutions or other domestic action (such as
citizenship revocation) related to the conflicts in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the
former Yugoslavia may take place many years from now.58
There are other potential residual functions that have been identified by com-
mentators, such as: assistance in return of proceeds of crime,59 compensation to
victims,60 preventing double jeopardy in future domestic proceedings,61 fulfill-
ment of the continuing prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory material to the
defense62 and continuing human resources obligations.63  Like the functions de-
scribed above, each of these functions could potentially be required for decades.
53 ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 26; ICTY Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, at Rules 119-21;
ICTR Statute, supra note 19, art. 25; ICTR Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, at Rules 120-23; SCSL
Statute, supra note 21, art. 21(2); SCSL Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, at 120-22.
54 ICTY Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, at Rule 119; ICTR Rules of Procedure, supra note 12, at
Rule 120; SCSL Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, at Rule 120.
55 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 32.
56 Id. para. 40.
57 Id.
58 Such a time delay is not unheard of.  For example, Canada launched a domestic prosecution in
1987 against an individual alleged to have committed war crimes during World War II. R. v. Finta,
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Can.).
59 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 46.
60 Id.
61 Expert Meeting Report, supra note 17, para. 10.
62 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 43.
63 VALERIE OOSTERVELD & TRACEY GURD, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE RESIDUAL ISSUES
EXPERT GROUP MEETING, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING RESIDUAL
FUNCTIONS AFTER PHYSICAL CLOSURE 6 (Feb. 21, 2008).
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III. The International Criminal Court and Residual Issues
There are two ways in which residual issues of the time-limited international
and hybrid criminal tribunals touch upon the ICC.  First, the ICC is currently
being considered as a possible host for one or more of the residual mechanisms
created to implement ICTY, ICTR, or SCSL residual issues.  Second, the ICC is
going to face residual issues itself as it completes its work on specific cases and
in specific countries; therefore, it may be able to learn from the experiences of
the time-limited tribunals.  Similarly, if residual issues are not adequately ad-
dressed for the time-limited tribunals, these failures could have a negative impact
upon the ICC’s work.
A. The ICC as a Possible Host of Residual Mechanisms
Turning to the first issue, the ICC is being discussed as a possible future host
institution for the joint ICTY-ICTR or SCSL residual mechanism.  Initially, some
states that were considering the question of how to address the ICTY, ICTR and
SCSL’s residual issues, raised the possibility of simply incorporating them into
the role and function of the ICC, such that the ICC would perform all of the
residual functions in its own name.64  One can understand why this idea would be
quite attractive as a potential solution: the ICC is permanent; it has jurisdiction
over the same general types of crimes as the time-limited tribunals (genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes); and it contains experts who understand
how to track fugitives, oversee sentence enforcement, protect witnesses and pre-
serve and protect archives.  However, almost immediately, it became apparent
that the residual functions of the time-limited tribunals could not simply be
folded into those of the ICC.  The ICC is a treaty body created by the Rome
Statute of the ICC.65  In contrast, the ICTY and ICTR were established by the
UN Security Council,66 and the SCSL was created through an agreement between
the UN Secretary-General and the Government of Sierra Leone.67  Thus, each of
the time-limited tribunals has a different legal mode of creation.  There are also
other legally important differences between the ICC and the time-limited tribu-
nals.  The ICC has different temporal and geographic jurisdiction than the time-
limited tribunals;68 some of the crimes are defined differently in the Rome Stat-
64 See U.N. SCOR, 5697th mtg. at 16-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5697 (June 18, 2007) (Statement by Mr.
Arias (Pan.)).
65 The Rome Statute of the ICC required 60 ratifications in order to enter into force. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 126 (July 17, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter Rome Statute of the ICC], 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1068 (1998).
66 See generally ICTY Statute, supra note 19 and ICTR Statute, supra note 19.
67 See generally SCSL Statute, supra note 21.
68 See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 65, art. 126 (The ICC’s temporal jurisdiction began on
July 1, 2002, whereas the jurisdiction of the ICTY began in 1991, the ICTR in 1994 and the SCSL in
1996); see also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ABOUT THE COURT, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ICC/About+the+Court/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010); ICTY Statute, supra note 19, art. 1; ICTR Statute,
supra note 19, art. 1; SCSL Statute, supra note 21, art. 1; see also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note
65, arts. 12-13 (The ICC’s jurisdiction extends to States Parties, and to countries or situations referred by
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ute than in the time-limited tribunals;69 some of the states with deep interests in
the time-limited tribunals are not States Parties to the Rome Statute;70 and the
procedures used by each of the time-limited tribunals differ from those of the
ICC.71  In order to address these crucial differences, the ICC’s Rome Statute and
other instruments would need to be amended.
The changes required for the ICC to perform residual ICTY, ICTR or SCSL
residual functions in its own name would go beyond relatively straightforward
amendments of “an exclusively institutional nature” permitted by article 122.72
Rather, amendments under article 121 – the general amendments provision -
would be required.  These amendments require consensus among the ICC States
Parties or, failing that, approval by a two-thirds majority with entry-into-force
occurring one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been de-
posited by seven-eighths of the States Parties.73  If the crime provisions of the
Rome Statute are amended, then there is a slightly different mode of entry-into-
force.74  Article 121 creates a high threshold for entry-into-force of substantive
amendments.  This complexity,75 combined with the fact that there is unlikely to
be any appetite in the near future among ICC States Parties to consider the kinds
of amendments required to transfer ICTY, ICTR or SCSL residual issues to the
jurisdiction of the ICC,76 makes complete absorption by the ICC of residual func-
the UN Security Council.  A non-State Party may also lodge a declaration accepting jurisdiction under
art. 12(3)).
69 ICTR Statute, supra note 19, art. 3; Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 65, art. 7 (for example,
the ICTR Statute requires an overarching element of discrimination on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds in all crimes against humanity, while the Rome Statute does not).
70 For example, the United States is a strong supporter of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, but is not a
State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC.
71 International Criminal Court, R. PROC. & EVID., paras. 121-26, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/Rules_of_procedure_and_Evi-
dence_English.pdf (The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL differ slightly
from each other, but differ significantly in many respects from the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the ICC. For example, the ICC’s Rules cover a procedure called a “confirmation of charges” hearing that
is not a procedure used by any of the time-limited tribunals).
72 Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 65, art. 122 (covering amendments to provisions of an institu-
tional nature, which may be proposed at any time and which, if adopted, enters into force for all States
Parties).
73 Id. arts. 121(3), (4).
74 Id. art. 121(5) (under the amendment procedure for the crime provisions, amendments enter into
force only for those States parties which accept the amendment through deposit of instruments of ratifica-
tion or acceptance. For those States Parties which do not accept the amendment, “the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State
Party’s nationals or on its territory.”).
75 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ,UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO FACULTY
OF LAW, PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERT
GROUP MEETING ON “CLOSING THE INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: MECHANISMS TO
ADDRESS RESIDUAL ISSUES,” (Mar. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Report on Closing the Int’l Tribunals], availa-
ble at http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/ICTJ_ResidIssues_2010rp_Final.pdf.
76 See Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala,
Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, RC/Res.5 (Jun. 16, 2010)
and Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda, May
31-June 11, 2010, The Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6 (Jun. 28, 2010) (amendments were made to the
Rome Statute to extend the war crimes provision to prohibit the use of certain weapons during non-
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tions unrealistic.  Similar complexities exist for options such as transferring only
some of the residual issues to the ICC, outsourcing some residual functions to the
ICC, or having ICC personnel double- or multi-hatting (performing functions
both as ICC personnel and as ICTY, ICTR and/or SCSL personnel).77
Attention has since shifted to whether the ICC’s facilities could be used to
perform some or all of the residual functions for the time-limited courts.  For
example, could the ICC’s facilities be used to provide courtroom, detention or
archiving space for the ICTY, ICTR or SCSL’s residual mechanisms to perform
their functions?  This has been described as a feasible option for ICC involve-
ment.78  There is already precedent in place for this option – the SCSL used the
ICC’s facilities from mid-2006 until May 2010 for the trial of Charles Taylor.79
Under the SCSL’s agreement with the ICC, the SCSL reimbursed the ICC for its
use of the ICC’s facilities, services and support.80  Thus, perhaps a similar ap-
proach could be used for the ICTY, ICTR or SCSL’s residual mechanism.  The
ICC’s Assembly of States Parties has indicated a willingness to consider this
option.  In November 2009, the ICC’s Assembly adopted a resolution
“[e]ncourag[ing] the Court to continue the dialogue with other international
courts and tribunals to assist with their planning on residual issues and to report
to the Assembly of States Parties on this dialogue.”81  This issue was addressed,
for example, at a February 2010 expert group meeting in New York on “Closing
the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Mechanisms to Address
Residual Issues”.82  Furthermore, in March 2010, the President of the ICC met
with the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Patricia
international armed conflict and to adopt a definition and modalities for the exercise of jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression.) There was some discussion that the next Review Conference would likely take
place in seven years, by which all of the time-limited international and hybrid criminal tribunals would
be closed.
77 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, at 13-18.
78 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Residual Functions and the ICC 3, 9 (Aug. 30,
2007) [hereinafter CICC Non-paper] (categorized as a “non-paper” that was not published on the CICC
website, on file with the Loyola University Chicago International Law Review).
79 United Nations, The situation in Sierra Leone, U.N. SC Res. 1688, UN SCOR 61st sess., 5467th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1688 (2006) para. 3 (nothing that the SCSL used the ICC facilities for the Taylor
trial); see also International Criminal Court, Memorandum of Understanding regarding Administrative
Arrangements between the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ICC
Doc. ICC-PRES/03-01-06, (April 13, 2006) [hereinafter SCSL-ICC Agreement], available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66184EF8-E181-403A-85B8-3D07487D1FF1/140161/ICCPRES030106_
en.pdf; see also Special Tribunal, supra note 51 (noting that the Taylor trial was moved to the facilities of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon when the ICC’s trial docket became heavier than it had been in 2006).
80 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 65 (This reimbursement is quite detailed, as it includes all
“clearly identifiable direct and indirect costs that the ICC may incur” including a component for any
depreciation in the value of ICC equipment and property); SCSL-ICC Agreement, supra note 79, arts. 3,
5, 13.
81 International Criminal Court, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of
States Parties, para. 3, ICC-ASP/8/Res.3 (2009).
82 Report on Closing the Int’l Tribunals, supra note 75, at 4 (Participants “noted that it would be
helpful to determine earlier rather than later whether the ICC might play a role with respect to hosting
one or more residual mechanisms, as the ICC’s permanent premises are scheduled to be completed in
2014. The issue of joint administrative tasks and their space requirements ought to be considered and,
ideally, communicated by the end of this year.”).
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O’Brien, to express “the Court’s openness to discussing how it could support the
residual mechanisms and archives of the closing ad hoc tribunals [–] the ICTY
and ICTR.”83
While recognizing the benefits that could emerge from the ICC hosting some
or all of the residual mechanisms for the time-limited tribunals, some commenta-
tors have indicated concern with such an idea.  They are worried that the ICC
may not have the capacity to both meet its own needs and provide assistance to
other institutions: “the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL’s residual functions will likely be
the most demanding in the first few years after they have completed their man-
dates, which[,] according to available estimations of completion strategies, will
coincide with a period when the ICC is engaged in a high volume, and perhaps
continuous, pattern of work.”84  Thus, they caution that, before the ICC agrees to
host any residual mechanism for the ICTY, ICTR or SCSL, it must determine as
accurately as possible what resources it can realistically offer to these institu-
tions.85  This is why, at a February 2010 expert group meeting, participants dis-
cussed the possibility that the ICC’s permanent premises – which have not yet
been constructed – be planned in such a way that they may accommodate hosting
residual mechanisms.86  This concern regarding the capacity of the ICC to host
other institutions is echoed in the recent experience of the SCSL. Under the
SCSL-ICC agreement, the ICC’s own requirements take priority over those of the
SCSL.87  Thus, as the ICC became busier, the SCSL’s Taylor trial had to reduce
its use of one of the ICC’s courtrooms.88  As a result, the SCSL moved the Tay-
lor trial to the facilities of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in nearby
Leidschendam.89
Among other concerns, the ICC is located in The Hague, far from the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.  If the ICC was used as a hub for the
residual mechanisms of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, it may be difficult for those
residual mechanisms to carry out their work in victim protection, sentence en-
forcement, and providing access to the affected populations to the archives.90
Others reply that some functions could be performed in or near affected societies,
perhaps via satellite or field offices.91  The current discussion within the Security
83 International Criminal Court, Weekly Update #28 at 3 (April 6, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/66246BE8-CDCB-4895-80FF-F10B2CFF73ED/281720/ed28_eng1.pdf.
84 CICC Non-paper, supra note 78, at 3.
85 Id.
86 Report on Closing the Int’l Tribunals, supra note 75, at 4.
87 SCSL-ICC Agreement, supra note 79, arts. 2(2), 2(3).
88 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T, Transcript, at 40486, lines 5-7 (May 3, 2010)
(The time pressures on the SCSL’s Taylor trial are evident in the transcript. For example, in the transcript
of May 3, 2010, the Presiding Judge notes that the Taylor trial needed to adjourn for the day at 1:00 p.m.
as the courtroom was needed for an ICC trial that afternoon).
89 See Special Tribunal, supra note 51.
90 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 42(v).
91 Id.
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Council is to establish one residual mechanism for the ICTY and ICTR, with two
branches, one in Europe (this one could be at the ICC) and one in Africa.92
On the other hand, commentators also note that, by using ICC facilities for
ICTY, ICTR and/or SCSL residual matters, there may be a reduction in operation
cost.93  These savings would stem from the fact that the residual mechanisms
would not need to have, among other things, their own courtrooms (including
attendant personnel such as interpreters and security), but could instead use the
ICC’s courtrooms.  Similarly, if the residual mechanisms could use the ICC’s
detention facilities and archive space, this would also reduce the need for the
residual mechanism to have and maintain such similar space.  The main difficulty
is that, at present, the ICC does not have extra courtroom and archive space.94
The estimated construction completion date of the new ICC premises is 2014,95
but unless additional space is planned for prior to construction, the same issues
(at least with respect to courtrooms and archives) may arise even after the move.
For example, the ICTY has estimated that, by the end of 2010, its physical
records will require 3,704 shelf meters and electronic records will amount to
8,000 terabytes or more (which require specific server rooms).96  The ICTR has
estimated that, by the end of 2010, its paper records will require 2,336 shelf
meters and digital storage requirements will amount to 1,020 terabytes (also re-
quiring specific server rooms).97  These requirements will clearly necessitate a
great deal of additional physical and digital space.
B. The ICC’s  Residual Issues
The ICC will face residual issues even though it is a permanent international
court as opposed to a time-limited court.  The ICC will eventually complete its
work in each of the current situation countries: Central African Republic, Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, the Darfur region of Sudan and Uganda.98
Following the completion of proceedings linked to those situation countries, the
ICC will have continuing obligations to protect victims and witnesses, ensure
enforcement of sentences and allow for access to archives to affected populations
in order to prevent historical revisionism and to facilitate historical research.
Similarly, it will be important for the ICC to protect and promote its legacy in the
situation countries even after the ICC’s field offices have closed their doors.
Thus, as Boas and Oosthuizen point out, the ICC will need to plan for many
‘post-case’ residual issues.99 The Committee on Budget and Finance of the ICC’s
Assembly of States Parties has recognized this, noting that “appropriate consider-
92 Charge´ d’affaires, supra note 6, para. 12.
93 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 67; Expert Meeting Report, supra note 17, para. 19.
94 Oosthuizen, supra note 24, para. 67; CICC Non-paper, supra note 78, at 3.
95 Permanent Premises, ICC-ASP/6/Res.1 (2007) para.14.
96 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 51.
97 Id.
98 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, SITUATIONS AND CASES, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
99 Boas and Oosthuizen discuss this issue in some detail, by asking these questions:
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ation should be given to the role that the field offices are expected to play and
how, at the conclusion of Court proceedings in a given area, any residual issues
should be handled.”100
IV. Conclusion: Lessons for the ICC from the Closure of the ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL
Given that the residual mechanisms for the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL have not
yet been established, and the role of the ICC in these mechanisms is still unde-
cided, are there any lessons at this early stage that can assist the ICC?  The an-
swer to this question is undeniably “yes.”  While the post-World War II
International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo provide little guidance
to the current-day tribunals about, for example, how to address victim and wit-
ness protection obligations, electronic archival needs or fugitive indictments,101
the work done to date on the post-closure options for the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL
on these issues has been invaluable.  The ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, along with the
Security Council and others, have had to consider how to address the sui generis
scenario of post-closure legal existence and operation. These institutions have not
only clarified the residual issues that must be planned for by the Security Coun-
cil, ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, they have identified issues that must also be consid-
After the completion of trials and appeals, should the Court keep in The Hague the originals of
Registry-registered written evidence and other materials such as physical exhibits that may be
used again in other cases or in post-case proceedings such as reviews? Would the public have
physical access to the non-confidential archive in The Hague, and under what procedure, and
would online web-based access be generally provided? Or should the Court retain copies of
public materials with their originals being transferred to the relevant authorities in the situation
country for archiving and public-memory-related purposes, for example? How and where would
the Court store the originals or copies, as the case may be? Who would be authori[z]ed to declas-
sify Registry-held confidential materials? To which national prosecuting authorities and other
bodies may and should the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] provide access to OTP-held confiden-
tial materials, and for what purpose and under which procedure? What would be the situation in
relation to materials collected for preliminary investigations that did not result in Pre-Trial
Chamber-authori[z]ed investigations? Who would be responsible for contacting victims and wit-
nesses for whom protected measures were ordered – in some instances many years earlier – by
judges about the possible lifting of those measures? What procedures would the Court have to
follow in relation to reports that someone convicted or acquitted by it is being tried again for the
same conduct at national level? How would the role of the Court change in relation to other
legacy issues such as countering misinformation about completed cases and helping to ensure a
positive and lasting impact on national healing, truth and justice efforts and justice-sector reform
efforts?;
GIDEON BOAS & GABRI ¨EL OOSTHUIZEN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SERVICES, Suggestions for Fu-
ture Lessons-Learned Studies: The Experience of Other International and Hybrid Criminal Courts of
Relevance to the International Criminal Court, at 15 n.41, (2010), available at http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/ICLS_REPORT_Lessonslearnedgapsstudy_FINAL.pdf.
100 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
BUDGET AND FINANCE ON THE WORK OF ITS TWELFTH SESSION (May 13, 2009), ICC-ASP/8/5, para. 73.
101 See Kevin Jon Heller, Completion Strategies and the Office of the Prosecutor, LEUVEN CENTRE
FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STUD. WORKING PAPERS, 7-9 (2009) (describing the relatively abrupt comple-
tion of the International Military Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East); see
also Guido Acquaviva, “Best Before the Date Indicated”: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY, The Legacy
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at 4-6, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, (Go¨ran Sluiter, Bert Swart & Alexander
Zahar eds.) (forthcoming 2010) (outlining the residual mechanisms put into place for the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals, which provide some interesting lessons learned on archival integrity).
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ered by the ICC in the future (even if the ICC will need to address residual issues
in a somewhat different manner due to the permanent nature of the institution).
Thus, the very fact that individuals and states have considered which obligations
continue past the closure of the time-limited tribunals, will assist the ICC in iden-
tifying ways to provide for its own continuing obligations when a situation
moves from being “live” to being “dormant.”
For example, consider the issue of fugitives.  While the ICC is a permanent
institution and therefore does not need to consider how to prosecute fugitives
post-closure, the ICC does need to consider and make policy decisions about
when it will scale down its investigatory and outreach presence in a situation
country in response to a lack of international action on arrest warrants.  These
pressures were already evident in the ICC’s eighth session of the Assembly of
States Parties in November 2009, in which there was some corridor discussion
regarding whether the Uganda field office of the ICC might be scaled down due
to lack of action on the arrests of Joseph Kony and other indicted individuals.102
If the ICC does scale down its presence in a situation country, it must also plan
for future rapid scaling up of investigatory, defense and outreach presence if
fugitives are captured and transferred to the ICC.  The ideas arising from the
discussions on how the joint ICTY and ICTR residual mechanism will scale up
using a roster mechanism should be of assistance.103
How will the ICC continue to protect victims and witnesses in situation coun-
tries after all of the trials are concluded, or in situation countries where lack of
arrests have led to a scaling down of ICC activity and presence?  This is the same
difficulty presented to the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL residual mechanisms.  For
both the ICC and the time-limited tribunals, the answer will depend on whether
funding is provided for an office in the relevant country.  For example, many of
the SCSL’s protected victims and witnesses are located in Sierra Leone.  There-
fore, there has been discussion that the SCSL’s residual mechanism will have an
office or focal point person in Freetown, which would make ongoing victim and
witness protection (and assessment of risks) in that country more straightforward
than managing such protection from the Netherlands.  The ICTY and ICTR joint
residual mechanism, on the other hand, is not likely to be located in the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda.104  If the ICC decides to close its field office, it will be in
a similar position to that of the ICTY and ICTR, and will need to rely on regional
coordination, perhaps from field offices in nearby countries.  This issue becomes
more difficult if there are no nearby offices.
102 This discussion was linked, in part, to: International Criminal Court, Report of the Court on the
Enhancement of the Registry’s Field Operations for 2010, (Nov. 4, 2009), ICC-ASP/8/33 para. 11, which
states: “It should be noted that the life span of a field office is dictated by the progress of the Court’s
judicial proceedings in a given situation and/or case. . . . There are various development in a situation
which may trigger a review of operations on the ground and, as a consequence, the scaling up or down of
field offices, such as, for example . . . where arrest warrants have been issued but not implemented for a
number of years.”
103 See The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 258 for a discussion of the use of rosters.
104 Charge´ d’affaires, supra note 6, para. 12.
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A third lesson that the ICC can learn from discussions on how to address
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL residual functions, is to adopt archiving policies from the
beginning of each situation that take into account how the archives will be dealt
with after a situation closure.  For example, the ICTY and ICTR did not adopt
common public/confidential security classification systems from the beginning of
their existence.  This has made preparing these tribunals’ archives for closure
more difficult.  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has learned from this experi-
ence and has employed an archivist to work on policies to keep track of the
sources of Tribunal documents,105 and ensure consistency in the way information
is classified and processed within the different organs.106  Similarly, while it can
be assumed that the ICC will hold the archives of the situations and related cases
at its headquarters in The Hague, the experience of the time-limited tribunals
suggest that a decision should also be made early on as to where copies of public
archival documents should be housed.  This should avoid or lessen the kinds of
debates that have taken place around the location of the ICTY and ICTR
archives.107
One final lesson that the ICC can extract from the discussions around the
ICTY, ICTR and SCSL residual mechanisms has to do with funding. Unlike the
time-limited tribunals, the ICC is funded through assessed contributions of its
States Parties and its budget is decided each year by the States Parties.  This
relieves one major concern that the SCSL continually faces – where funds will
come from to pay for its residual mechanism.108  However, it does not relieve
another potential concern: pressure from or decisions of the States Parties to
eliminate field offices for budgetary reduction purposes once all of the cases in a
situation have been dealt with, or in situations where there is lack of action on
arrest warrants.109  If such decisions are made, the ICC will need alternative via-
105 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s documents currently include not only Tribunal-generated doc-
uments, but also documents from the International Independent Investigation Commission and the Gov-
ernment of Lebanon.
106 Special Tribunal, supra note 51.
107 For example, Bosniak victim groups and some officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina (including
the Mayor of Sarajevo) have requested that the ICTY’s archives be located in Sarajevo or Srebrenica;
however, representatives from Serbia and Croatia have strongly opposed placing the archives anywhere
in the region, fearing for their security, accessibility of the materials and misuse of the materials for
political purposes. See Report of the President on the Conference Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY to
the United Nations, para. 7 (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Events/100427_
legacyconference_pdt_report.pdf (last visited July 15, 2010).
108 The SCSL is funded through voluntary contributions. It already has difficulty raising enough funds
to cover its regular operations, despite the ongoing, high-profile trial of Charles Taylor. There is a con-
cern that it will be much more difficult for the SCSL to secure voluntary contributions once it completes
its work and transitions to a much lower-profile residual mechanism. We need a citation here stating the
SCSL is having trouble raising funds despite the Charles Taylor trial. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: JUNE 2009-
MAY 2010 36 (2010) (“Despite these greatly appreciated contributions [of almost $15 million US], the
Court faces a funding gap of $11.1 million to close the Court.”).  “In spite of the significant budgetary
reductions by the Court, the Court continues to experience serious difficulties in securing adequate fund-
ing to complete its mandate. This is due to the funding mechanism, which relies solely on the voluntary
contributions of the international community.” Id. at 40.
109 The ICC will need to carry a budget line for addressing residual issues for completed situations
and cases. The ICC will also need to consider how it will retain institutional knowledge of the situations
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ble plans for ongoing victim and witness protection and archival access for af-
fected populations.110
In the future, it may be that all of these considerations will come together if
the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and Special Tribunal for Lebanon (and any similar future
time-limited tribunals) are attached to the ICC as a common administrative
hub.111  In the meantime, the ICC should continue to be involved in, and kept
apprised of, developments and decisions related to the creation of the ICTY,
ICTR and SCSL residual mechanisms.
and cases after they are completed. See Eric Møse, The ICTR’s Completion Strategy – Challenges and
Possible Solutions, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 667, 678 (2008) (voicing similar concern about loss of institu-
tional knowledge post-ICTR closure).
110 This article is focused on residual functions, but a legacy issue also exists: the ICC needs to have a
plan as to how it will continue to reach out to individuals and protect, promote and enhance its legacy
absent field presence.
111 The Secretary-General Report, supra note 5, para. 248 (“Rather than establish a series of stand-
alone and potentially costly residual mechanisms, a longer term strategic view may suggest leaving the
door open for them each to be attached to one common administrative hub at some point in the future.
This might be . . . the International Criminal Court . . . as the only permanent international criminal
court.”).
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